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ABSTRACT 
Apathy, defined as a reduction in voluntary goal-directed behaviors, is one of the most common 
behavioral symptoms encountered in Alzheimer disease (AD). However, the processes underlying 
the different components of apathy are still unclear. The aim of this study was to explore a 
particularly important aspect of executive function in daily life: multitasking [assessed with the 
Modified Six Elements Task (MSET)], and its relationship with apathy in AD. Sixty-seven participants 
(37 AD patients matched with 30 control participants) were screened using the MSET. 
Simultaneously, a close relative of each patient was given the Apathy Inventory, which assesses 3 
distinct dimensions of apathy (lack of initiative, lack of interest, and emotional blunting). AD patients 
presented significantly more multitasking deficits than control participants. In addition, regression 
analyses revealed that the number of rule breaks on the MSET (inability to perform several tasks in 
a predefined time observing a number of rules) was the best predictor of apathy, and especially of 
lack of initiative. These results suggest that the relation between lack of initiative and multitasking 
has a specific character and that mechanisms underlying multitasking constitute a key component 
of goal-directed behaviors. 
 
Apathy is one of the most common behavioral symptoms of Alzheimer disease (AD).1 It represents 
the main cause of suffering in AD patients’ relatives and constitutes the first motive for admission 
into an institution.2 Apathy can also exist in the preclinical phase of AD, alerting the clinician to a 
possible progression toward this disease.3 Moreover, a longitudinal study by Starkstein et al4 showed 
that apathy in AD was a significant predictor of a faster cognitive, functional, and emotional decline. 
There is general agreement that diminished goal- directed behavior (GDB) is the core feature of 
apathy,5 which is commonly divided into 3 dimensions: loss or decrease of initiative, loss or decrease 
of interest, and reduced emotion (affective blunting).6 Levy and Dubois7  argued that apathy was 
related to executive disturbances (eg, difficulties in maintaining goals, shifting, and planning) and 
to dysfunctions affecting emotional processes (eg, disruption of the association between affective 
or emotional signals and ongoing or forthcoming behaviors). Nevertheless, the processes 
underlying the different components of apathy are still unclear. 
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A few studies have tried to investigate the mechanisms underlying apathy in dementia, and 
particularly in AD. McPherson et al8 showed that apathy in AD was significantly associated with poor 
performance on executive function tests, such as the Trail-Making Test and the Stroop color 
interference test. in addition, a study by Robert et al9 showed that apathy in AD was significantly 
related to a divided attention impairment observed in the dual-task procedure developed by 
Baddeley et al.10 More recently, Tsoi et al11 showed that an executive dysfunction, especially deficits 
affecting verbal fluency (number of animals named in 1 min) and ideational fluency (unusual uses 
for a bottle), was a significant predictor of apathy in dementia. 
However, most of the executive tests used in these studies focused essentially on isolated executive 
aspects (such as mental flexibility), without considering the demands of the real world, whereas in 
everyday life GDB requires multiple processes and self-initiated behaviors. It is likely that apathy 
appears preferentially in complex real-life situations, which require the organization and structuring 
of GDB in situations with few external constraints. Prototypical situations of this kind in daily life are 
those involving ‘‘multitasking’’ (the ability to run multiple tasks simultaneously).12 
Multitasking characterizes numerous situations in daily life13 that involve a number of delayed 
intentions (eg, ‘‘I have to go to work, prepare my talk for this afternoon and remember to pick the 
children up from school’’). It is underlain by multiple mechanisms involved in GDB. Indeed, 
multitasking is characteristic of complex situations with few external constraints, and requires a 
number of executive competencies, such as selecting, organizing, and executing various tasks within 
a given time period.12 Moreover, the performance of multiple tasks is related to the capacity to pay 
attention in a flexible way to internal representations (‘‘stimulus-independent thought,’’ ie, goals, 
action plans, emotions, etc) and external information (‘‘stimulus-oriented thought,’’ ie, information 
provided by the environment).14 A disturbance specifically affecting this flexible allocation of 
attention toward internal and external information could therefore contribute to the presence of 
apathetic manifestations, and particularly to lack of initiative (GDB reduction), by making the person 
incapable of coordinating intentions and environmental stimuli. In addition, Burgess et al15 showed 
that multitasking was related to (1) the ability to remember the rules of a task, (2) the ability to form 
an appropriate plan, and (3) the ability to follow a plan, comply with rules, shift between tasks and 
carry out delayed intentions. 
Shallice and Burgess16 developed the Six Elements Task (SET), which assesses multitasking 
capacities. The SET looks at the ability to schedule and monitor the execution of an action plan, is 
relatively open-ended, and requires that participants decide of their own accord when to initiate 
and terminate subtasks.15 Studies have shown low correlations between the SET and traditional 
laboratory executive tests, whereas there are strong correlations between the SET and multitasking 
deficits in daily life.17 This suggests that disabilities in situations involving multitasking are not 
reflected in performance on tests of executive functions that do not involve multitasking. Currently, 
a simplified version of the SET is commonly used, the Modified Six Elements Task (MSET).18 The 
MSET, like the SET, is relatively open-ended and requires self-initiative. Specifically, it requires the 
capacity to create, maintain, and activate delayed intentions, as the right time to switch to a given 
task is not signalled by the situation.15 From this perspective, the inability to create or consider 
internal signals that act prospectively as triggers for the initiation of behavior,17 as well as the 
inability to flexibly allocate attention toward internal and external information,14 may explain poor 
performance on the MSET and reduced GDB. A recent study highlighted a strong relationship 
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between poorer performance on the MSET and a series of externalizing behavior changes in 
traumatic brain injury patients (eg, irritability and lack of planning), but also, to a lesser extent, with 
internalizing changes such as depression.19 These results suggested that the cognitive processes 
involved in the MSET are prerequisites for regulating emotion and promoting optimal behavior. In 
addition, a study by Burgess et al20 found a significant correlation between the factor 
“intentionality”—a key concept in apathy—of the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX)18 and the MSET. 
The objective of the current study was to explore the relations between multitasking and apathy, 
and particularly lack of initiative, which is characterized by a reduction in GDB (decline in self-
initiated and environment-stimulated behaviors5). More specifically, we assume that multitasking 
situations tap particularly well into a specific set of cognitive processes, which are essential for 
competency in daily life and GDB. In this context, we investigated the relationships between the 
three dimensions of apathy (initiative, interest and emotion), assessed with the Robert et al. Apathy 
Inventory (AI),21 and multitasking performance, assessed with the MSET. Considering that initiative 
is very dependent on executive processes (such as planning, set-shifting, self-generation of rules, 
self-retrieval of information from episodic memory, and prospective memory7), we hypothesized 
that multitasking difficulties (more rule breaks and fewer subtasks on the MSET) constitute the best 
predictor of the lack of initiative dimension of apathy. 
METHODS 
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE 
A total of 67 participants took part in this study. The patient group was recruited in the Geneva 
Memory Clinic (University Hospital of Geneva, Switzerland), in the Grenoble Neuropsychology Unit 
(University Hospital of Grenoble, France) and in the Liege Memory Centre (University Hospital of 
Liege, Belgium). All the patients met the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative 
Disorders and Stroke Alzheimer Disease and Related Disorders Association criteria for probable AD22 
on the basis of a detailed neurologic, psychiatric, and neuropsychologic examination. The patients 
were at the early stage of the disease and consisted of 37 nonconsecutive patients (21 men and 16 
women). They were aged between 57 and 90 years (M = 73.38, SD = 8.04) and their educational level 
varied from 9 to 17 years of education (M = 13.14, SD = 2.84). Only patients for whom a close relative 
could complete a hetero-evaluation questionnaire on apathy were included in the study (of the 
persons who completed this questionnaire, 78% were spouses and 22% were adult children). The 
control group consisted of 30 participants (14 men and 16 women) aged between 58 and 92 years (M 
= 73.83, SD = 8.52). Their educational level varied from 8 to 19 years of education (M = 13.4, SD = 2.72). 
They were recruited from the general population and matched for age, sex, and number of years of 
education with the AD patients. Both groups performed the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE)23 
(for the French validation Ref. 24); the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale (DRS)25 (for the standards of this 
scale Ref. 26); the MSET18 (a simplified adaptation of Shallice and Burgess test16); and the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAD)27 (for the French validation of this scale Ref. 28). The order of 
these questionnaires was counterbalanced. Inclusion criteria for the control participants were 
scores within the normal range on the MMSE and the DRS. Apathy was not assessed in the control 
participants. All participants gave their written consent to participate, and the study was approved 
by the ethics committee of the University Hospital of Geneva. 
Published in Alzheimer Disease & Associated Disorders (2010), vol. 24, n°2, pp. 
131-137 
DOI: 10.1097/WAD.0b013e3181c9c168 




NEUROPSYCHOLOGIC MEASURES AND APATHY ASSESSMENT 
DRS25 
Cognitive impairment was assessed with the DRS. The DRS is a dementia screening instrument that 
yields an index of global cognitive functioning including 5 cognitive subscales: Attention, Initiation 
and Perseveration, Construction, Conceptualization, and Memory. The Initiation/ Perseveration 
subscale measures executive functions (category fluency and complex sequencing abilities) and has 
been shown to correlate significantly with other executive tests.29 Total DRS score ranges from 0 to 
144, with higher scores reflecting better performance. 
MSET18 
The MSET is one of the subtests of the Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome,18 which 
assesses the ability to manage time, multitasking capacities, planning, and prospective memory. It 
involves dividing the available time between 3 simple tasks (description, picture naming, and 
arithmetic), each of which is split into 2 sections (A and B). Participants are not permitted to carry 
out the first section (A) of a given subtask followed immediately by the second section (B) of the 
same subtask or vice versa; otherwise, they are free to organize their efforts with the overall 
objective of carrying out 1 part of each of the 3 tasks in 10 minutes. Note that the time allowed is too 
short to perform the tasks in their entirety, so the participants have to be careful to do a bit of 
everything and not linger over a subtask. What constitutes an adequate performance is not defined 
by external signals; participants have to decide for themselves when to switch between tasks, 
choose objectives that are suitable, and decide when they have achieved them.15 In this way, the 
MSET contains all the characteristics of everyday multitasking situations outlined above. Note that 
the main performance index on this test is the raw score, which is based on the number of subtasks 
attempted minus the number of rule breaks committed (with a range from 0 to 6). The variables 
retained are (1) the number of subtasks performed and (2) the number of rule breaks. 
AI21 
The AI is a reliable questionnaire, which provides a brief separate quantitative assessment of the 3 
dimensions of apathy: emotional blunting (lack of emotional responses, eg, ‘‘Is he/she as affectionate 
and does he/she express emotion as usual?’), lack of initiative (diminished GDB, decrease in finalized 
activities, eg, ‘‘Does he/she initiate a conversation and make decisions?’’), and lack of interest 
(diminished goal-directed cognition, decrease in the importance or the value attributed to one’s 
own person or activities, eg, ‘‘Does he/ she seem interested in the activities and plans of others?’’). The 
questions deal with behavioral changes that have occurred since the beginning of the disease. We 
used the hetero-evaluation form in which questions (yes/no) are asked to determine whether 
behavior changes are present or absent. If the response is negative, the clinician assigns the score 
of 0 and proceeds to the next item. If the response is positive, the clinician explores the frequency 
and gravity of the item with simple questions (‘‘How frequently do these problems arise?’’ and ‘‘How 
severe are these problems? To what extent do they disturb or handicap the patient?”). For each of the 
3 dimensions, the maximum score (frequency of 1 to 4 multiplied by gravity of 1 to 3) is 12, giving a 
maximum total score of 36. The AI has good internal consistency and test-retest reliability21 and has 
been validated in French. 
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Exploratory analyses of the data revealed that most of the variables were normally distributed; 
therefore, parametric tests were performed. Thus, t tests for independent samples were used to 
compare the performance of AD patients and control participants on neuropsychologic tests, and 
specifically to investigate whether AD patients had significantly more difficulties in multitasking on 
the MSET than control participants. Second, Pearson parametric correlations were examined to 
explore the relationships between the AI, the MSET, and the demographic and clinical data. Finally, 
multiple regression analyses were performed to find out which components best predict the lack of 
initiative dimension of apathy. 
RESULTS 
EXPLORATORY ANALYSES 
Exploratory analyses of the skewness and kurtosis of each test and (sub) scale revealed that most of 
the data were normally distributed, considering that absolute values for skewness and kurtosis 
greater than 3 and 20, respectively, are judged to be extreme.30 Specifically, except for the DRS 
construction subscale, for which the skewness is — 3.08 and the kurtosis 10.05, the results showed 
that skewness ranged from — 2.22 to 2.18 and kurtosis from — 1.12 to 6.50. Thus, there was no 
indication of a strong deviation from normality. 
GROUP COMPARISONS 
Group comparisons on the neuropsychologic tests (MMSE, DRS, MSET) using independent sample t 
tests are reported in Table 1. It should be noted that all analyses were 2-tailed, with the α level set 
at 0.01 to reduce type I errors due to multiple tests or comparisons. The results revealed significant 
group differences on the MMSE and the DRS, except the DRS construction and concept subscales, 
for which we observed a trend toward significance (construction, P = 0.04; concept, P = 0.014). In 
addition, group differences were also statistically significant for the MSET: AD patients made 
significantly more rule breaks and attempted significantly fewer subtasks than control participants. 
As regards depression and anxiety, although there was no significant difference between groups, 
scores were slightly higher in the AD group than in the control group, particularly for depression (P 
= 0.08). 
CORRELATION ANALYSES 
In the AD group, Pearson correlations were computed between AI clinical dimensions (lack of 
initiative, lack of interest, emotional blunting), MSET (number of rule breaks and number of 
subtasks), MMSE, DRS, HAD, age, and number of years of education (Table 2). Correlation analyses 
revealed that the lack of initiative score correlated positively and significantly with the number of 
rule breaks: the higher the lack of initiative score was, the greater the number of rule breaks. As for 
the lack of interest and emotional blunting scores, the correlations were not significant. Note that 
there were no significant correlations between the three AI dimensions and the number of subtasks 
on the MSET. 
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TABLE 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Group Comparisons on the MMSE, DRS, HAD, and MSET for AD and 
Control Groups (Independent Sample t Test) and Means and Standard Deviations on the AI for the AD Group 
 
 AD Patients (N=37) Controls (N=30)   
Measures M (SD) Р 99% CI 
MMSE 23.76 (2.69) 28.97 (1.03) 0.000001* ( - 6.59- - 3.83) 
DRS total 121.92 (8.97) 138.27 (3.54) 0.0000001* ( - 20.96- - 11.73) 
Attention 34.59 (1.92) 35.93 (1.05) 0.001* ( - 2.38- - 0.30) 
Initiation/perseveratio
n 
29.62 (4.24) 35.73 (1.36) 0.0000001* ( - 8.26- - 3.97) 
Construction 5.76 (0.64) 6.0 0.04 ( - 0.55-0.07) 
Concept 35.0 (4.22) 37.07 (1.66) 0.014 ( - 4.24-0.11) 
Memory 17.16 (4.00) 23.5 (1.76) 0.0000001* ( - 8.42- - 4.25) 
HAD anxiety 7.92 (4.4) 6.57 (2.8) 0.15 ( - 1.11-3.81) 
Depression 4.81 (3.27) 3.5 (2.53) 0.08 ( - 0.62-3.24) 
MSET no. rule breaks 1.35 (0.92) 0.13 (0.35) 0.0000001* (0.75-1.69) 
No. subtasks 4.97 (1.17) 5.93 (0.25) 0.000038* ( - 1.54- - 0.38) 
Apathy Inventory total 6.57 (7.01) — — — 
Lack of initiative 2.84 (3.47) — — — 
Lack of interest 2.73 (3.19) — — — 
Emotional blunting 1.00 (2.04) — — — 
Effect sizes were reported within their 99% confidence interval (CI). 
*P < 0.01, statistically significant. 
AD indicates Alzheimer disease; AI, Apathy Inventory; DRS, Dementia Rating Scale; HAD, Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale; MMSE, Mini-Mental State Examination; MSET, Modified Six Elements Task. 
 
TABLE 2. Correlations Between AI Dimensions and Demographic and Clinical Data 
 
Effect sizes were reported within their 99% CI. 
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0 not included in the 99% confidence interval. 
AI indicates Apathy Inventory; DRS, Dementia Rating Scale; HAD, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; MMSE, 
Mini-Mental State Examination; MSET, Modified Six Elements Task. 
 
As regards the MSET, it is interesting to note that the memory subscale of the DRS correlated 
significantly with the number of rule breaks. In other words, the poorer the memory performance, 
the more rule breaks there were. Moreover, there was also a positive trend between age and the 
number of rule breaks (r = 0.35, P = 0.034), as well as a negative trend between the DRS memory 
subscale score and the lack of initiative score (r = — 0.30, P = 0.073). However, there was no significant 
correlation between the DRS executive factor (initiation/perseveration subscale) and the lack of 
initiative score. As well, no significant correlations were found between the AI dimensions, age, years 
of education, MMSE, and DRS. Finally, the depression score on the HAD correlated marginally with 
emotional blunting (r = 0.39, P = 0.018) and lack of initiative (r = 0.35, P = 0.035). 
REGRESSION ANALYSES 
A regression analysis was performed to find out which components best predicted lack of initiative. 
A regression analysis allows one to highlight the relative importance of each predictor and 
determine the specific effect of each one, because it takes into account the relations between the 
various predictors entered in the regression. We therefore computed a multiple linear regression 
using the number of rule breaks on the MSET, the depression score on the HAD, the memory subscale 
of the DRS and the MMSE score as predictors, and the lack of initiative score as the dependent 
variable (Table 3). There was no multicollinearity and the results showed that the number of rule 
breaks was the best predictor of lack of initiative, although depression was also a significant 
predictor of lack of initiative [adjusted R2 0.362, F(4,32) = 6.10, P <0.00091]. 
TABLE 3. Multiple Regressions for Lack of Initiative 
Dependent 
Variable Predictor Variable B SE t P β 
Lack of initiative (Intercept) 2.50 4.46 0.56 0.57 — 
 No. rule breaks 2.16 0.61 3.52 0.001* 0.57W 
 Depression (HAD) 0.42 0.14 2.95 0.006* 0.40W 
 Memory (DRS) 0.12 0.16 0.75 0.46 0.14 
 MMSE - 0.28 0.19 - 1.44 0.16 - 0.22 
*P <0.01. 
0 not included in the 99% CI. 
CI indicates confidence interval; DRS, Dementia Rating Scale; HAD, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; 
MMSE, Mini-Mental State Examination. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the relationships between the 3 dimensions of apathy 
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assessed by the AI and multitasking performance on the MSET in AD patients. Our results first 
showed that the AD group made more rule breaks and completed fewer subtasks than the control 
group; this result is in line with studies showing executive deficits in AD.31 Second, as regard to 
apathy in the AD group, correlation and regression analyses revealed that (1) the number of rule 
breaks on the MSET was the best predictor of lack of initiative; (2) lack of initiative did not significantly 
correlate with the MMSE score, nor with any subscore of the DRS, and in particular the subscore for 
executive functioning; (3) there was no significant correlation between the other dimensions of the 
AI and the MMSE or DRS; (4) depression was also a significant predictor of lack of initiative; and (5) 
depression also correlated strongly with emotional blunting. 
These results suggest that the relationship between lack of initiative (reduction in GDB, as evidenced 
by a decrease in self-initiated and environment-stimulated behaviors5) and multitasking 
performance (underlain by multiple processes allowing one to run multiple tasks simultaneously15) 
has a relatively specific character. More precisely, mechanisms underlying multitasking seem to 
constitute key components of GDB, which may be affected in patients suffering from lack of 
initiative. Besides, unlike the DRS initiation/perseveration subscale (usually considered as a 
measure of executive functioning), the MSET measures processes specific to multitasking situations 
often encountered in everyday life such as the flexible allocation of attention toward internal and 
external information.14 In addition, the MSET requires the capacity to create, maintain, and activate 
delayed intentions and thus to self-initiate behaviors.15 
It should be noted that in the apathy criteria, a distinction is made between self-initiated and 
environment- stimulated behaviors. Indeed, Robert et al21 distinguish between loss of self-initiated 
behaviors (eg, starting a conversation) and loss of environment-stimulated behaviors (eg, 
responding to conversation); they emphasize that apathy may persist in the presence of external 
stimulation. This distinction also applies to interest (spontaneous vs. environment-stimulated 
curiosity) and emotion (spontaneous emotion vs. emotional responsiveness to stimuli). Our study 
showed that initiative is closely related to multitasking, which is underlain by multiple mechanisms, 
such as prospective memory, shifting, planning, and coordination between internal and external 
information. We assume that a dysfunction of one of these components can affect self-initiated 
and/or environment-stimulated behaviors. For instance, prospective memory requires the 
occurrence of the appropriate event or time to activate the memory of the intention, without 
external solicitations, and prompt the subject to initiate an action32; thus, it seems to be linked to 
self-initiated behavior. As for the capacity to pay attention to internal representations and external 
information, it could be connected to both self-initiated (considering internal signals, eg, one’s 
feelings to initiate an action) and environment-stimulated behaviors (considering external signals, 
eg, suggestions by a friend to initiate something). 
Another aspect of our results merits further discussion: although the number of rule breaks on the 
MSET was a significant predictor of lack of initiative, the number of subtasks was not. This may 
suggest that different processes are involved in these 2 aspects of the MSET. Rule breaks could 
depend on prospective and retrospective memory,12,33 as our results confirmed (significant 
correlation between rule breaks and DRS memory subscale), but also on planning capacities, 
consideration of internal signals acting as triggers for voluntary changes, and correct reevaluation 
of goals.17,33,34 As for the number of subtasks, it could be linked to the inability to strategically plan, 
organize, and update current information, and to monitor ongoing performance.33 A study by 
Published in Alzheimer Disease & Associated Disorders (2010), vol. 24, n°2, pp. 
131-137 
DOI: 10.1097/WAD.0b013e3181c9c168 




Alderman et al35 with brain-injured participants showed 2 patterns of failure (number of rule breaks 
or failure to initiate tasks) in the simplified version of the Multiple Shopping Errands Test (The 
Multiple Shopping Errands Test, a ‘‘real-life’’ multitasking test carried out in a shopping center, 
requires the participant to buy specific things, obtain some information, be in a particular place at 
a particular time, and follow several rules while doing these things35). These 2 patterns were 
associated with different executive problems in everyday life. Patients who broke the rules were 
judged by caregivers to have memory problems, seemed less inhibited (ie, tended to ask for help 
more readily) and failed to act on the information that they received (difficulties following goal-
oriented plans). By contrast, patients who failed to initiate tasks were reported by caregivers to be 
apathetic and essentially to lack emotion, as assessed with the negative factor of the DEX. The 
Alderman et al study suggests that people with multitasking difficulties may fail to initiate tasks or 
may initiate tasks but fail to complete them correctly (rule breaks) because of executive problems. 
Our results were a bit different, insofar as the number of subtasks was not associated with apathy. 
However, the multitasking situation used by Alderman et al35 is quite different from the MSET: it is 
conducted in a real environment, the rules are more concrete, and the number of subtasks is higher 
(12 subtasks). Indeed, the small number of subtasks to carry out on the MSET (only 6) means that it 
is probably not sensitive enough and reduces the interindividual variability. Furthermore, there is 
no specific evaluation of apathy in the Alderman et al study, although the negative symptom factor 
of the DEX includes some apathetic symptoms (such as emotional blunting). In further studies, then, 
it would be interesting to use a more ecologic task with more subtasks, such as the Multiple 
Shopping Errands Test, and to examine its links with apathy, as assessed with the AI. 
Regarding depression, the positive trend observed with emotional blunting is probably due to the 
overlap of the contents of certain items of the scales used. Indeed, 5 items out of 7 in the HAD refer 
to the presence/absence of pleasure (eg, “I take pleasure in the same things as formerly’) or the 
presence/absence of positive affect (eg, ‘‘I am in a good mood’’), 2 aspects that are characteristic of 
emotional blunting. Further studies should therefore explore relationships between the dimensions 
of apathy and a particular aspect of depression that is not characteristic of emotional blunting, such 
as negative mood (sadness and hopelessness). As for the link between depression and lack of 
initiative, it could be due to the presence of 3 items related to pleasure (eg, ‘‘I am looking forward to 
doing particular things”). In fact, pleasure is partly underlain by anticipatory mechanisms (capacity 
to feel pleasure in future situations36), which seem to support initiative.37 We suggest that a deficit in 
anticipatory pleasure may explain a decline in initiative, because of the lack of sensitivity to reward 
and the inability to project oneself into future pleasant situations.37 Nevertheless, this hypothesis 
should be examined more directly. 
As for lack of interest (the third AI dimension), it refers to the incapacity to feel or manifest an 
attraction for an object or an activity.21 According to Silvia,38 interest is closely related to cognitive 
appraisals, which are determinants of emotions.39 In particular, 2 specific cognitive appraisal 
processes seem to be related to interest: (1) an evaluation of the event’s novelty and complexity, 
and (2) an evaluation of the event’s comprehensibility.40 These 2 appraisal processes can occur 
automatically and outside of awareness,41 which could explain why the MSET (which mainly involves 
controlled processes) did not correlate with lack of interest. 
To conclude, the main result of this study is the finding of a specific relationship between lack of 
initiative and multitasking performance. An examination of the specific questions that make up the 
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lack of initiative indicates that the initiative subscale refers to decision-making and self- 
initiated/environment-stimulated prosocial GDB, aspects that are involved in multitasking. More 
generally, our results suggest that the construct of apathy is too broad and made up of independent 
elements that have different relationships with aspects of everyday functioning. Beyond this aspect, 
although congruent with other studies that highlighted relationships between executive 
dysfunction and apathy in dementia (eg, Tsoi et al11), the results obtained in this study do not really 
allow us to posit a specific directionality of these relationships. Consequently, longitudinal studies 
are clearly needed to clarify the predictive role of specific executive disorders for the lack of initiative 
dimension of apathy. Moreover, further studies are also required to clarify the links between 
multitasking and the various apathy dimensions, by more directly exploring multitasking 
components (such as the flexible allocation of attention toward internal and external information, 
as well as planning or prospective memory). For example, it would be interesting to use a task 
developed by Gilbert et al42 to assess a core component of multi-tasking: the ability to flexibly 
allocate attention toward either internal representations (stimulus-independent thought) or 
external information (stimulus-oriented thought). In this task, participants have to process stimuli 
in 2 alternating experimental phases: a stimulus-oriented thought phase (cognitive processes 
provoked by incoming sensory information) and a stimulus-independent thought phase (cognitive 
processes that are not related to any information in the immediate sensory environment). More 
generally, future studies should explore the variety of mechanisms involved in the facets of apathy, 
including not only executive mechanisms, but also motivational aspects (eg, anticipatory pleasure), 
emotional aspects (eg, negative mood), and aspects linked to personal identity (eg, self-esteem). 
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